Physical Layer Security in Frequency-Domain Time-Reversal SISO OFDM
  Communication by Golstein, Sidney et al.
Physical Layer Security in Frequency-Domain Time-Reversal
SISO OFDM Communication
Sidney Golstein∗,†, Trung-Hien Nguyen †, Philippe De Doncker †,
Franc¸ois Horlin †, and Julien Sarrazin∗
October 7, 2019
Abstract
A frequency domain (FD) time-reversal (TR) precoder is proposed to perform physical
layer security (PLS) in single-input single-output (SISO) system using orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM). To maximize the secrecy of the communication, the design
of an artificial noise (AN) signal well-suited to the proposed FD TR-based OFDM SISO
system is derived. This new scheme guarantees the secrecy of a communication toward a
legitimate user when the channel state information (CSI) of a potential eavesdropper is not
known. In particular, we derive an AN signal that does not corrupt the data transmission
to the legitimate receiver but degrades the decoding performance of the eavesdropper. A
closed-form approximation of the AN energy to inject is defined in order to maximize the
secrecy rate (SR) of the communication. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate
the security performance of the proposed secure FD TR SISO OFDM system.
Keywords: Physical layer security, time-reversal, eavesdropper, SISO-OFDM, artificial
noise, secrecy rate, security.
1 Introduction
Due to their broadcast nature, wireless communications remain unsecured. With the deploy-
ment of 5G as an heterogeneous network possibly involving different access technologies, physi-
cal layer security (PLS) has gained recent interests in order to secure wireless communications,
[1–3]. PLS classically takes benefit of the characteristics of wireless channels, such as multi-
path fading, to improve security of communications against potential eavesdroppers. A secure
communication can exist as soon as the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the
legitimate user one, [4]. This can be achieved by increasing the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at the intended position and decreasing the SINR at the unintended position if
its channel state information (CSI) is known, and/or, by adding an artificial noise (AN) signal
that lies in the null space of the legitimate receiver’s channel. While many works implement
these schemes using multiple antennas at the transmitter, only few ones intend to do so with
single-input single-output (SISO) systems [5–9].
In [5], a technique is proposed that combines a symbol waveform optimisation in time-
domain (TD) to reach a desired SINR at the legitimate receiver and an AN injection using the
remaining available power at the transmitter when eavesdropper’s CSI is not known. Another
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Figure 1: Conventional FD TR SISO OFDM system
approach to increase the SINR in SISO systems is time reversal (TR). This has the advantage to
be implemented with a simple precoder at the transmitter. TR achieves a gain at the intended
receiver position only, thereby naturally offering a possibility of secure communication, [10].
TR is achieved by up/downsampling the signal in the TD. It as been shown in [6] that TR
can be equivalently achieved in frequency domain (FD) by replicating and shifting the signal
spectrum. FD implementation has the advantage to be easily performed using orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM). To further enhance the secrecy, few works combine
TD TR precoding with AN injection [7–9]. In these works, the AN is added either on all the
channel taps or on a set of selected taps. While the condition for AN generation is given, its
derivation is however not detailed. Furthermore, the impact of the back-off rate (BOR), defined
as the up/downsampling rate [11], has not been yet studied in the literature.
An approach to establish secure communication using a FD TR precoder in SISO OFDM
systems is proposed. An AN signal is designed to maximize the secrecy rate (SR) of the commu-
nication in presence of a passive eavesdropper whose CSI is supposed unknown. The proposed
scheme uses only frequency diversity inherently present in multipath environments to achieve
security. It can therefore be used in SISO systems and is then well-suited for resource-limited
nodes such as encountered in Internet-Of-Things (IoT) for instance. Indeed, MIMO capabilities
require several antennas and as many transceivers and ADC/DAC, which might not fit into
small-size sensors and could be too power-consuming for such IoT scenarios. Furthermore, the
OFDM implementation makes this approach compatible with LTE and 5G systems.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: the conventional FD TR-based OFDM
system is presented in Section 2 as well as the way to design and inject the AN. In Section 3, a
closed-form approximation of the amount of AN energy to be injected in order to maximize the
SR is derived. Theoretical and numerical results are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
Notation: the underlined upper-case letter denotes a column vector. Double-underlined upper-
case letter corresponds to a matrix; I
N
is the N × N identity matrix; (.)−1, (.)∗, (.)H are
respectively the inverse, the complex conjugate, and the Hermitian transpose operators; E is
expectation operator; x! is the factorial of a positive integer x.
2 System Model
2.1 Conventional FD TR SISO OFDM communication
The FD TR precoding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1. The communication is designed such that
the data focuses at the legitimate receiver’s position, i.e., at Bob. An eavesdropper, Eve, tries
to intercept the data. We assume that the transmitter Alice does not have any information
about Eve’s CSI. The data is conveyed onto OFDM symbols with Q subcarriers. Without loss
of generality, we consider that only one OFDM block X is sent over the FD TR precoding
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SISO OFDM system. A data block X is composed of N symbols Xn (for n = 0, ..., N − 1,
with N ≤ Q). The symbol Xn is assumed to be a zero-mean random variable with variance
E
[
|Xn|2
]
= σ2X = 1 (i.e., a normalized constellation is considered). The data block X is then
spread with a factor U = Q/N , called back-of rate (BOR), via the matrix S of size Q × N .
The matrix S stacks U times N × N diagonal matrices, with diagonal elements taken from
the set {±1} and being identically and independently distributed in order not to increase the
peak-to-average-power ratio (PAPR) as suggested in [12]. This matrix is normalized by a factor√
U in order to have SHS = I
N
:
S =
1√
U
.

±1 0 . . . 0
0 ±1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ±1
...
...
±1 0 . . . 0
0 ±1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ±1

(1)
As stated in [6], the idea behind the spreading is that up-sampling a signal in the TD is equivalent
to the repetition and shifting of its spectrum in the FD. In doing so, each data symbol will be
transmitted onto U different subcarriers with a spacing of N subcarriers, introducing frequency
diversity. The spread sequence is then precoded before being transmitted. This requires the
knowledge of Bob channel frequency response (CFR) at Alice. The channels between Alice and
Bob (H
B
) and between Alice and Eve (H
E
) are assumed to be static during the transmission of
one OFDM symbol. H
B
and H
E
are Q×Q diagonal matrices whose elements are HB,q and HE,q
(for q = 0, ..., Q− 1) and follow a zero-mean unit-variance normal distribution. The precoding
matrixH∗
B
is also a diagonal matrix with elementsH∗B,q. At the receiver, a despreading operation
is performed by applying SH . We consider that Bob and Eve decoding abilities are identical.
They both know the spreading sequence and apply a Zero Forcing (ZF) equalization. A perfect
synchronization is assumed at Bob and Eve positions.
2.1.1 Received sequence at the intended position
After despreading, the received sequence at Bob is:
Y B = S
H
∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S X + SHV B (2)
where V B is the FD complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The noise’s auto-correlation
is E[|VB,n|2] = σ2V,B and the covariance matrix is E[(SHV B).(SHV B)H ] = σ2V,B.IN . We also as-
sume that the signal Xn and noise VB,n are independent of each other. In (2), each transmitted
symbol is affected by a real gain at the position of the legitimate receiver since the product
H
B
H∗
B
is a real diagonal matrix. The gains differ between each symbol in the OFDM block
but increases with an increase of the BOR value as each symbol would be sent on more subcar-
riers and would benefit from a larger frequency diversity gain. If we consider a fixed bandwidth,
the TR focusing effect is enhanced for higher BOR’s at the expense of the data rate. After ZF
3
Figure 2: FD TR SISO OFDM system with added Artificial Noise
equalization, we obtain:
XˆB =
(
SH
∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S)−1(SH ∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S X + SHV B) (3)
From (3), we observe that the transmit data is perfectly recovered in the absence of noise.
2.1.2 Received sequence at the unintended position
After despreading, the data received at the unintended position is given by:
Y E = S
HH
E
H∗
B
S X + SHV E (4)
where V E is the complex AWGN. The noise’s auto-correlation is E[|VE,n|2] = σ2V,E and the
covariance matrix is E[(SHV E).(SHV E)H ] = σ2V,E.IN . In (4), HEH
∗
B
is a complex diagonal ma-
trix, and each transmitted symbol is affected by a random complex coefficient. The magnitude
of this coefficient does not depend on the BOR value. It results in an absence of TR gain at the
unintended position. As a consequence, worse decoding performance is obtained compared to
the intended position. Eve needs lower noise power than Bob to reach the same bit-error-rate
(BER). After ZF equalization one obtains:
XˆE =
(
SHH
E
H∗
B
S
)−1 (
SHH
E
H∗
B
S X + SHV E
)
(5)
Equation (5) shows that in the classical FD TR SISO OFDM communication scheme, the data
could potentially be recovered at Eve’s position. A similar BER could be obtained at Eve if she
is close to Alice than Bob is and/or if the noise power is less than Bob’s one. This motivates
the addition of AN in order to corrupt the data detection at any unintended positions and to
secure the communication.
2.2 FD TR SISO OFDM communication with Artificial Noise
In order to further secure the communication between Alice and Bob, an AN signal W is added
after precoding to the useful signal Xs at the transmitter side, as depicted in Fig.2. The AN
should not have any impact at Bob’s position but should be seen as interference everywhere
else since Alice does not have any information about Eve’s CSI. Furthermore, this signal should
not be guessed at the unintended positions to ensure the secure communication. With these
considerations, the transmitted sequence becomes:
XTR =
√
α H∗
B
S X +
√
1− α W (6)
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where α ∈ [0, 1] defines the ratio of the total power dedicated to the useful signal, knowing
that E
[∣∣∣H∗
B
S X
∣∣∣2] = E [|W |2]. Whatever the value of α, the total transmitted power remains
constant.
2.2.1 AN design
In order not to have any impact at the intended position, the AN signal must satisfy the
following condition:
SHH
B
W = 0 (7)
where 0 is the null vector of dimension N × 1. From (7), the following system must be solved:
±1 0 . . . 0 ±1 0 . . . 0
0 ±1 . . . 0 . . . 0 ±1 . . . 0
...
. . .
... . . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ±1 0 0 . . . ±1

N ×Q

HB,0
HB,1
...
HB,Q−1

Q× 1


W0
W1
...
WQ−1

Q× 1
=

0
0
...
0

N × 1
(8)
where “” represents the element-wise (Hadamard) product. Equation (8) is a set of N equa-
tions with Q unknowns. Since Q = NU , as soon as U ≥ 2, (8) becomes under-determined
and the AN vector can be generated from a set of infinite possibilities. Let us define SH =
[S
0
S
1
... S
U−1], where Si is the i
th diagonal matrix of SH of size N ×N . We define as Si,p as
the pth diagonal element of S
i
. If we denote the ith diagonal element of H
B
as Hi, (8) becomes:
U−1∑
i=0
Si,0HiNWiN = 0
U−1∑
i=0
Si,1HiN+1WiN+1 = 0
...
...
U−1∑
i=0
Si,N−1HiN+N−1WiN+N−1 = 0
(9)
In (9), each equation consists in a sum of U elements, with the channel components and the
spreading sequence being known. The idea is to generate U −1 components of the AN vector in
every equations of (9) as normal random variables, and to determine the last AN components
that ensures (7) as follow:
WQ−N = −
U−2∑
i=0
Si,0HiNWiN
SU−1,0HQ−N
WQ−N+1 = −
U−2∑
i=0
Si,1HiN+1WiN+1
SU−1,1HQ−N+1
...
...
WQ−1 = −
U−2∑
i=0
Si,N−1HiN+N−1WiN+N−1
SU−1,N−1HQ−1
(10)
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2.2.2 Received sequence at the intended position
After despreading, the received sequence at Bob is:
Y B =
√
α SH
∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S X + SHV B (11)
Again, each transmitted symbol is affected by a real gain depending on the BOR value and
weighted by
√
α. One can observe that no AN contribution is present in (11) since (7) is
respected. A ZF equalization is performed at the receiver:
XˆB =
(√
α SH
∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S)−1(√α SH ∣∣∣H
B
∣∣∣2 S X + SHV B) (12)
From (12), a perfect data recovery is possible in the absence of noise.
2.2.3 Received sequence at the unintended position
After despreading, the received sequence at the unintended position is given by:
Y E =
√
α SHH
E
H∗
B
S X +
√
1− α SHH
E
W + SHV E (13)
In (13), a term depending on the AN signal appears since SHH
E
W 6= 0. This term introduces an
interference at Eve and thus scrambles the received constellation even in a noiseless environment.
After ZF equalization, the estimated symbols are:
XˆE =
(√
α SHH
E
H∗
B
S
)−1
(√
α SHH
E
H∗
B
S X +
√
1− α SHH
E
W + SHV E
) (14)
Equation (14) shows that the addition of AN in the FD TR SISO OFDM communication can
secure the data transmission. It is to be noted that since W is generated from an infinite set
of possibilities, even if Eve happens to know H
B
, she cannot estimate the AN to try retrieving
the data. The degree of security will depend on the amount of AN energy that is injected into
the communication, as shown in Section 3.
3 Performance Assessment
The secrecy rate (SR) is defined as the maximum transmission rate that can be supported by
the legitimate receiver’s channel while ensuring the impossibility for the eavesdropper to retrieve
the data, [13]. In the ergodic sense, it can be expressed as:
CS = E [log2 (1 + γB)− log2 (1 + γE)] , γB > γE
≤ log2 (1 + E [γB])− log2 (1 + E [γE ])
(15)
with γB and γE being respectively the signal-to-interference-plus-noise Ratio (SINR) at Bob
and Eve’s positions. The inequality in (15) arises from the Jensen’s inequality.
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3.1 SINR determination
3.1.1 At the intended position
At Bob, the received signal after despreading is given by (11). Using the Jensen’s inequality, a
lower bound on the average SINR can be derived for the transmitted symbols n as:
E [γB,n] = E
[
α |Kn Xn|2
|VB,n|2
]
= αE
[
|Kn Xn|2
]
E
[
1
|VB,n|2
]
≥
αE
[
|Kn Xn|2
]
E
[
|VB,n|2
] = αE
[
|Kn Xn|2
]
σ2V,B
(16)
where Kn =
1
U
∑U−1
i=0 |HB,n+iN |2 is a real random variable (RV) independent of the data symbol
Xn, and the noise VB,n is considered independent of Kn and Xn. If HB,n+iN (∀i = 0, ..., U − 2)
elements are assumed to be non-correlated1, Kn can be approximated as following a chi-square
distribution with U degrees of freedom, so that:
E
[
|Kn|2
]
=
∞∫
0
z2fZ(z)dz =
(U + 1)
U
(17)
Furthermore, remembering that E
[
|Xn|2
]
= 1, the average SINR for symbols n at the intended
position is then given by:
E [γB,n] ≥ α (U + 1)
U σ2V,B
(18)
It was observed in simulations than the upper-bound (18) is tight enough to be used as an
approximation of the averaged SINR at the intended position.
3.1.2 At the unintended position
The received signal after despreading is (13). Let’s introduce A1 =
√
1− αSHH
E
W and A2 =√
αSHH
E
H∗
B
S X. Using the Jensen’s inequality, an approximation of a lower bound of the
averaged SINR of the symbols n at the unintended position can be derived as2:
E [γE,n] = E
[
|A2,n|2
|VE,n +A1,n|2
]
≈ E
[
|A2,n|2
]
E
[
1
|VE,n +A1,n|2
]
≥
E
[
|A2,n|2
]
E
[
|VE,n +A1,n|2
] = E
[
|A2,n|2
]
E
[
|VE,n|2
]
+ E
[
|A1,n|2
] (19)
1Thanks to the design of the spreading matrix, the U subcarriers composing one symbol are spaced by
N = Q/U subcarriers. If this distance is larger than the coherence bandwidth of the channel, the assumption
holds. This usually occurs in rich multipath environments and for sufficiently large bandwidths and moderate
BOR values.
2Neglecting the covariance between |A2,n|2 and |VE,n +A1,n|2, as done in the first line of (19), makes the nature
of the bound, i.e., lower or upper, obtained for E [γE,n] uncertain. However, we have observed by simulations
that it remains a lower one for all considered scenarios.
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Assuming HE,n+iN (∀i = 0, ..., U − 2) elements non-correlated and neglecting the correlation
introduced in W by (10)3, the AN interference can be calculated as:
E
[
|A1,n|2
]
=
(1− α)
U
U−1∑
i=0
E
[
|Wn+iN |2
]
E
[
|HE,n+iN |2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= (1− α) σ2AN
(20)
where σ2AN = E
[
|Wn+iN |2
]
, and Wn+iN and HE,n+iN are independent.
The energy related to the useful symbol is:
E
[
|A2,n|2
]
=
α
U2
E
∣∣∣∣∣
U−1∑
i=0
HE,n+iN H
∗
B,n+iN
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 E [|Xn+iN |2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
α
U2
E
[
|Zn|2
] (21)
with Zn =
∑U−1
i=0 Zn,i and Zn,i = HE,n+iN .H
∗
B,n+iN (where HE,n+iN and H
∗
B,n+iN are assumed
to be statistically independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian RVs). Zn,
similarly to Kn, is the sum of uncorrelated complex RVs. Introducing R = |Zn|, we obtain the
PDF of R as in [6]:
fR(r) =
4rU
Γ(U)
KU−1 (2r) (22)
where Γ(U) = (U − 1)! = ∫∞0 zU−1e−zdz is the Gamma function of the integer U . In (22), KU
is the U th order modified Bessel function of the second kind which can be approximated by:
KU (x) ≈
D∑
q=0
D∑
l=0
ψ(U, l, q) e−x xq−U (23)
where D specifies the number of expansion terms and ψ(U, l, q) is given by:
ψ(U, l, q) =
(−1)q √pi Γ(2U) Γ(1/2 + l − U) L(l, q)
2U−q Γ(1/2− U) Γ(1/2 + l + U) l! (24)
3This approximation holds for sufficiently large BOR values since only one term depends on U − 1 terms in
each equation of (10).
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where L(l, q) is the Lah number [14] with the conventions L(0, 0) = 1, L(l, 0) = 0, L(l, 1) =
l! ∀l > 0. Eq. (21) therefore becomes:
E
[
|A2,n|2
]
=
α
U2
∞∫
0
r2
4rU
Γ(U)
KU−1(2r) dr
=
4α
U2 (U − 1)!
D∑
q=0
D∑
l=0
ψ(U − 1, l, q)
∞∫
0
rU+2 e−2r (2r)q−U+1 dr
=
4α
U2 (U − 1)! 2U+3
D∑
q=0
D∑
l=0
ψ(U − 1, l, q) Γ(q + 4)
(25)
Consequently, an approximation of the averaged SINR’s lower bound for transmitted symbols
n at the unintended position can be expressed as:
E [γE,n] '
4α
U2(U−1)!2U+3
∑D
q=0
∑D
l=0 ψ(U − 1, l, q)Γ(q + 4)
σ2V,E + (1− α)σ2AN
(26)
It has been observed in simulations that (26) remains a lower bound for γE,n as long as U ≥ 4.
Furthermore, it is a tight-enough bound to be used as an approximation for the secrecy capacity
derivation.
3.2 Optimal amount of Artificial Noise energy to maximize the secrecy ca-
pacity
With (15), (18) and (26), it is possible to obtain a closed-form approximation of the SR upper
bound and determine the amount of AN energy to inject that maximizes the SR.
Introducing A = 1
U2 (U−1)! 2U+3
∑D
q=0
∑D
l=0 ψ(U − 1, l, q) Γ(q + 4), the SR is therefore:
Cs / log2
(
1 +
α(U + 1)
Uσ2V,B
)
− log2
(
1 +
4αA
σ2V, + (1− α)σ2AN
)
/ log2
(
Uσ2V,B + α(U + 1)
Uσ2V,B
.
σ2V,E + (1− α)σ2AN
σ2V,E + (1− α)σ2AN + 4αA
) (27)
Let us denote T1 = σ
2
AN(U+1), T2 = σ
2
V,E(U+1)−Uσ2V,Bσ2AN+σ2AN(U+1), T3 = Uσ2V,B
[
σ2V,E + σ
2
AN
]
and T4 = 4AUσ
2
V,B − σ2V,Bσ2AN. After some manipulations, (27) becomes:
Cs / log2
(−α2T1 + αT2 + T3
αT4 + T3
)
(28)
To maximize the secrecy rate as a function of the parameter α, we find the zeroes of:
∂Cs
∂α
=
−α2T1T4 − 2αT1T3 + (T2T3 − T3T4)
(αT4 + T3)
2
−α2T1 + αT2 + T3
αT4 + T3
. ln 2
(29)
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Bob , AN energy = 0 %
Bob , AN energy = 5 %
Bob , AN energy = 90 %
Eve , AN energy = 0 %
Eve , AN energy = 5 %
Eve , AN energy = 90 %
Figure 3: BER as a function of the level of noise for different AN energy values, BOR = 4
Figure 4: BER as a function of AN energy for different BOR values, Eb/N0 = 15dB
After some algebraic manipulations, one obtains:
∂Cs
∂α = 0 ⇔ αopt =
±
√
T 21 T
2
3 + T1T2T3T4 − T1T3T 24 − T1T3
T1T4
(30)
where only the positive roots are solutions since α ∈ [0, 1].
4 Simulation Results
A 256-subcarrier SISO OFDM system is considered. Bob and Eve channels are assumed to
be uncorrelated. Each subcarrier is Rayleigh distributed and there is no correlation between
subcarriers. The overall channel energies are normalized to unity for each channel realization.
Bob’s CSI is assumed to be perfectly known at Alice. Bob and Eve have the same level of noise.
The number of expansion terms of the modified Bessel function is set to D = 20 for which
convergence has been observed. Simulations with 100 channel realizations and 300 OFDM
blocks were performed using a 4-QAM modulation scheme.
4.1 Decoding results
Fig. 3 and 4 show the system performance in terms of BER obtained after ZF equalization at
Bob and Eve. In Fig. 3, the BER is plotted as a function of Eb/N0, where Eb is the energy per
bit, calculated after spreading, and N0 is the noise power spectral density. Different levels of
AN energy are investigated at fixed BOR. It can be observed that, as soon as a small amount
of radiated energy is dedicated to AN, e.g., 5%, Eve’s BER strongly increases. At the intended
position, the BER also increases but much slower. The reason is that the higher the percentage
of energy dedicated to AN, the lower the received useful signal power at Bob. In Fig. 4, the
BER is plotted as a function of the AN energy, at fixed Eb/N0 = 15 dB and different BOR
values. At the unintended position, the BER naturally increases with the amount of injected
10
Figure 5: Secrecy Rate as a function of the AN energy for different BOR values, analytic vs
simulated curves Eb/N0 = 20 dB
Figure 6: Optimal AN energy to inject and maximal Secrecy Rate for different BOR values,
Eb/N0 = 20 dB
AN, whatever the BOR value. At Bob, low BER values can be maintained for high AN power
by increasing the BOR, as anticipated from Section 2.1. One can notice that, when α→ 0, the
BER curves all converge to 0.5, as expected.
4.2 Secrecy results
Fig. 5 shows the SR evolution as a function of α for different BOR values. First, it can be seen
that analytic curves, given by (28), approximate well the simulation curves. Eq. (28) remains a
tight upper bound for all scenarios but U = 2. As anticipated in section 3.1.2, this is because of
the correlation introduced in W which is large for small BOR values and which was neglected
in the derivation of (28). In addition, the SR obtained with the classical FD TR SISO OFDM
system presented in Section 2.1, i.e., no AN signal, is enhanced with the addition of AN except
for very high percentages of AN. Furthermore, the SR increases when the BOR becomes higher
because the TR gain becomes larger at Bob for higher BOR values but not at Eve. No more
secrecy is obtained when α→ 0, since the SINR’s at Bob and Eve drop to zero.
Fig. 6 illustrates the values of αopt given by (30) that maximize the SR determined from the
closed-form approximation (28), as well as obtained from the numerical simulations. The ana-
lytic estimation of the optimal amount of AN energy is not perfect but, the resulting simulated
SR is very close to the maximal SR. The reason can be observed in Fig. 5 where the SR varies
very slowly about its maximum when α changes. So, for a given BOR value, Alice can make a
rough determination of αopt and therefore the available SR, if Eb/N0 is known.
11
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the problem of securing the FD TR SISO OFDM wireless transmission from a
transmitter to a legitimate receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper is considered. A
novel and original approach based on the addition of an AN signal onto OFDM blocks that
improves the PLS is proposed. This approach can be easily integrated into existing standards
based on OFDM. It only requires a single transmit antenna and is therefore well suited for
devices with limited capabilities. Analytic and simulation results show that the novel approach
significantly improves the security of the communication and so considerably jeopardizes any
attempt of an eavesdropper to retrieve the data.
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